Empowerment Zones, Neighborhood Change and Owner Occupied Housing by Krupka, Douglas J. & Noonan, Douglas S.
IZA DP No. 3320




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
January 2008 
Empowerment Zones, Neighborhood 
Change and Owner Occupied Housing 
 
 
Douglas J. Krupka 
IZA  
 
Douglas S. Noonan 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 












This paper examines the effects of a generous, spatially-targeted economic development 
policy (the federal Empowerment Zone program) on local neighborhood characteristics and 
on the neighborhood quality of life, taking into account the interactions amongst the policy, 
changes in neighborhood demographics and neighborhood housing stock. Urban economic 
theory posits that housing prices in a small area should increase as quality of life increases, 
because people will be more willing to pay to live in the area, but these changes in prices and 
quality of life will also affect the demographics of the population through sorting and the 
housing stock through reinvestment. Using census block-group-level data, we examine how 
housing prices respond to the Empowerment Zone policy intervention. Changes in the other 
dimensions of neighborhood quality (demographics and housing stock characteristics) will 
also help determine the total, or full effect on housing values of the policy intervention. This 
paper estimates these direct and indirect effects in a simultaneous equations setting, 
compares indirect and full effects, and examines the robustness of the effects to alternate 
estimation strategies. We find strong evidence for substantively large and highly significant 
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I. Introduction 
Spatially targeted economic development policy has been a popular tool for addressing 
the problem of entrenched concentrations of poverty in urban areas.   Such spatially 
targeted programs usually consist of tax incentives and other off-the-books expenditures.  
Over the 1980’s many states created such programs, generically referred to as enterprise 
zones,
1 which provide economic incentives (usually through tax abatements) for 
companies that create jobs in these depressed areas.  While the popularity of such 
programs is irrefutable, the efficacy of spatially targeted development incentives is not 
well understood.  While early case-study research suggested that the programs were 
effective, more recent research has cast this early consensus into considerable doubt. 
During the Clinton administration, the Federal Government created a similar 
program, called Empowerment Zones (henceforth EZs), which coupled tax incentives and 
wage credits with large amounts of federal funding for community development.  This 
program was continued during the early years of the Bush administration.  At present, the 
EZ initiative covers over 700 census tracts with a combined population of over 3 million 
individuals in 31 communities (Greenbaum and Bondonio 2004).   Although the 
generosity of the program has varied over time, total incentives and grant expenditures 
are valued at over 5 billion dollars, according to the HUD website.  Despite, the extent of 
the program, the literature on the effects of the EZ program is relatively undeveloped, 
even compared to the more extensive literature on state enterprise zone programs.  
                                                 
1 Terminology in this field is unfortunately problematic, because the state-level programs have various 
names.  In this paper, we use the term enterprise zone to signify any of the various state programs and 
Empowerment Zone (or EZ) to refer to the more generous federal program.  A federal program called 
enterprise communities also exists, but this program is more similar to the state programs than the federal 
Empowerment Zone program.   2
  In this paper, we examine the effects of the federal program over a wide variety of 
neighborhood-level indicators.  We focus on the total effect of the Empowerment Zone 
intervention, which likely includes not only direct effects, but several types of indirect 
effects.  This approach conceives of neighborhood outcomes as the result of a 
complicated interplay between economic, demographic and housing market forces.  
Recent researchers have had trouble finding significant direct effects of spatially targeted 
economic development programs.  By identifying both the direct effects and the indirect 
effects, our approach offers EZ status its “best chance” to show some positive effect on 
neighborhood quality.   
Our results show that for our preferred measure of neighborhood quality (housing 
values) EZ status appears to have had statistically significant and substantial positive 
effects.  The effects of EZ status on other neighborhood characteristics was more mixed. 
The indirect effects vary somewhat depending on specification and estimation method, 
but are generally either small or negative. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on 
state and federal spatially targeted economic development incentives.  Section III lays out 
a conceptual foundation for our empirical section, discusses the empirical specification, 
and describes the data.  Section IV presents and discusses the results.  Section V 
concludes.   
 
II. Literature 
Winnick (1966) lays out a very strong case against place-based policy.  The primary 
justification for spatially targeted economic development programs lies in the persistence   3
of concentrations of poverty, mainly in urban areas..  Kain (1968) framed the problem in 
terms of the spatial mismatch hypothesis (SMH), which posited that blacks were 
prevented from commuting or moving to the suburbs, where their labor was demanded, 
and that low-skill jobs were prevented from moving into the central city, where the low-
skill black population lived.  The spatial mismatch of low-skill labor supply and low-skill 
labor demand causes the location-constrained inner-city residents to experience adverse 
labor market outcomes.  Since that seminal paper, spatially-targeted policies have 
become popular at many levels of government.  While the SMH enjoyed several decades 
of empirical support, more recent work taking into account the endogeneity of residence 
choice has cast some doubt on the causal relationship between spatial mismatch and poor 
central city labor market outcomes.
2   Whether the SMH holds or not, it is widely 
accepted by policy-makers, and spatially targeted economic incentives can be seen as an 
attempt to correct for the cost differentials that keep businesses from locating in the inner 
city. 
  Even in the absence of a causal effect of spatial mismatch, local jurisdictions may 
wish to spur development within their boundaries to increase tax receipts.  It is not far 
fetched to believe that localized tax incentives could be beneficial for local jurisdictions, 
even if they had no effect on the indigenous population.  Bartik (1991) reviewed the 
literature on the effects of local taxes on business activity and found that the elasticity of 
business activity with respect to local tax rates lay somewhere between -1 and -3.  If this 
is true, decreasing local taxes (even in a small section of the jurisdiction) could be 
                                                 
2 Gurmu et al.(2006) uses panel data to control for individual-specific fixed effects, finding that access to 
employment has little effect on employment outcomes for their sample of Atlanta-area TANF recipients.  
Kling et al. (2004) use the random assignment of neighborhood achieved in the Moving To Opportunity 
experiments to look at the effects of job access, and find that the experimental group (who were encouraged 
to move to low-poverty neighborhoods) did not have better labor market outcomes.     4
revenue-enhancing for local governments.
3  These large elasticities suggest that the 
effects of local tax incentives may be large, and that enterprise zones may be an effective 
policy tool from a local perspective. 
  Research examining the effects of spatially targeted incentives has concentrated 
on the various state programs.  While many studies have found that enterprise zones have 
faired well in terms of employment, Boarnet (2001) points to the many methodological 
pitfalls inherent in straight comparisons of zones to non-zone areas.  More rigorous 
evaluations of the state programs have not been lacking.  An extensive review of this 
literature can be found in Peters and Fisher (2002).  They find that while early 
econometric studies of the effects of state enterprise zones usually found positive results,
4 
more recent results have been much less favorable.
5  Peters and Fisher offer several 
possible explanations for this set of findings.  They suggest that the tax incentives are not 
generous enough to overcome the substantial disadvantages associated with the targeted 
areas.  They also suggest that the administration of zones, which often put conditions on 
the incentives that exist, may reduce their attractiveness.  Bondonio and Greenbaum 
(2007) suggests that the insignificant net effects mask countervailing positive effects on 
                                                 
3 These elasticity figures pertain to changes in business activity within a metropolitan area.  Elasticities are 
of much smaller magnitude (between -0.1 and -0.6) when comparing changes in business activity across 
large areas.  This implies that any tax advantages a jurisdiction might expect are coming primarily from 
other near-by jurisdictions, not through the attraction of business from other parts of the country.  Of 
course, in the case of targeted incentives, the lower taxes may be drawing businesses away from other parts 
of the same jurisdiction.  Such possibilities complicate any kind of cost/benefit analysis of such programs.  
In this paper we focus only on the local effects of the program, not the measurement of the benefits. 
4 Erickson and Friedman (1990), Papke (1993), Papke (1994) are examples. 
5 Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Greenbaum (1998) Greenbaum and Engberg (2000), Engberg and Greenbaum 
(1999), Bondonio and Engberg (2000) and Peters and Fisher’s (2002) own analysis all point towards this 
conclusion.  Elvery (2004) is another very careful analysis that finds insignificant results of enterprise zone 
status.     5
new firms and negative effects on existing firms (who exit the zone), along with a 
number of other interesting results.   
  The literature examining the effects of the federal Empowerment Zone program is 
much less developed.  Wallace (2003) examines the probability of an EZ applicant being 
selected, while Greenbaum and Bondonio (2004) examine how the selection of federal 
EZs has changed over the three rounds of the program.  Oakley and Tsao (2006, 2007a, 
b) use propensity score matching, as in much of the recent literature on the state 
programs, to examine the effect of Chicago’s and some other Empowerment Zones on a 
variety of socio-economic neighborhood outcomes.  While they find some localized 
effects (e.g. on poverty and related variables in the case of Chicago’s zone), they 
characterize the effects as underwhelming.  When pooling the four zones
6, the 
intervention had no significant effects on poverty, unemployment or average household 
income.   
  While most of the studies mentioned above examine job creation or employment 
outcomes, our primary variable of interest will be the value of owner-occupied housing in 
a neighborhood.  While we will also be examining the effect of EZ status on employment 
outcomes of neighborhood residents, this more traditional variable takes a secondary 
position in our analysis.  This is because the empowerment zone program is supposed to 
improve neighborhoods along a variety of dimensions (McCarthy 1998), not just improve 
employment outcomes.  As such, the general quality of life in a neighborhood should be 
improved by the program.  If the program is successful in making a neighborhood more 
attractive, the price of housing should increase (Rosen 1974, Bartik and Smith 1987).   
                                                 
6 The other three zones were located in Baltimore, Detroit and New York City.  The analysis of all four 
zones is carried out in Oakley and Tsao (2006).  The other two papers focus exclusively on Chicago.     6
Our empirical approach will allow us to examine the effects of EZ status on other 
variables of more traditional concern (employment outcomes, poverty, etc.), but housing 
values will be the main variable of interest.   
 
III. Empirical model and data 
A.  Empirical model 
The empirical model used here follows closely on Noonan et al. (2007).  We refer 
the reader to that paper for the details of the model, and focus here on its highlights.  The 
hedonic approach generally uses cross-sectional data to predict housing prices.  A 
national database of individual home prices would be required to analyze a national 
program such as Empowerment Zones in this way.  Such a data base is not available, so 
we are forced to use neighborhood averages as proxies for these individual values.  The 
use of aggregated data, even at the neighborhood level, limits our ability to infer price 
effects at the individual level.  Nonetheless, some hedonic research has shown that 
estimates using aggregate data produce reasonably accurate results (Freeman 1979, 
Nelson 1979, O’Byrne et al. 1985).
7  Noonan et al. (2007) also find generally plausible 
implicit prices in OLS estimations using aggregated data.  Moreover, the median housing 
value in a neighborhood is of considerable policy import.  Learning more about the 
effects of a policy on this neighborhood measure is informative, even if it does not 
recover the true underlying hedonic price.  The results based on such aggregate measures 
                                                 
7 See Shultz and King (2001) for additional review of the use of aggregated Census data in hedonics.  
Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) use a similar data set for their analysis of superfund designation, although 
they use the larger geography of the census tract.    7
can be viewed in an epidemiological light; the effects of average policy exposure on 
average outcomes, while perhaps not the ideal, are nonetheless interesting. 
An advantage of our data is that these neighborhood averages can be observed 
over time.  One potential problem with a simple OLS approach to the hedonic equation in 
levels is that some neighborhood characteristics will be unobserved and correlated with 
the other variables of interest.  This may be especially important in the context of EZs, 
since EZ designation was not randomly distributed, but was targeted at distressed 
neighborhoods (Greenbaum and Bondonio 2004).  To mitigate this problem, we estimate 
the model in first differences.  This strategy purges our parameter estimate of bias from 
the omission of time-invariant variables (Mendelsohn et al. 1992, Zabel 1999), and we 
thus identify the parameters from within-neighborhood changes in neighborhood quality, 
neighborhood demographic conditions, and housing structural characteristics.  Our 
primary equation of interest can be expressed as in equation 1, 
 (1)  ,  it it M it N it S it EZ it M N S Z E P 1 0 ε β β β β β & & & & & & + + + + + =
where t indexes time, i indexes neighborhoods,  , P is the median house 
value value, S is a vector of structural characteristics of the neighborhood housing stock, 
N is a set of neighborhood demographic characteristics and M is a vector of municipal 
characteristics such as public services and taxes that may vary with time.  Differenced out 
of this equation are any time-invariant geographic factors that affect price (such as 
distance to the CBD, metropolitan-wide factors, views or unobserved quality of the 
neighborhood).
1 , , − − = t i t i it X X X &
8  Finally, the EZ variable allows the designation of a neighborhood as an 
                                                 
8 In the results reported below, we allow for some of these geographic factors to affect median price 
appreciation.     8
Empowerment Zone to have an independent effect on neighborhood attractiveness.  Such 
an effect is possible if EZ tax incentives increase employment in the area, or the federal 
funds are used to improve neighborhood quality, or lower taxes.   
   It is likely that many of the variables in equation (1) are set simultaneously with 
price, however, so that equation (1) is part of a larger system.  If changes in 
neighborhood quality also affect the types of housing and demographic characteristics, it 
will be important to control for the simultaneity bias when estimating the direct and 
indirect effects of federal intervention on home values, as is the goal of this paper.  We 
model the neighborhood housing stock as a partial adjustment process, with current levels 
a function of lagged levels and other variables.  For comparability to equation (1) and to 
avoid problems associated with unobserved effects being correlated with independent 
variables, we run all our regressions in first differences, as in equation (2):   
(2)  .  it it M it P it N it EZ t it S it M P N Z E S S 2 0 1 ε γ γ γ γ γ γ & & & & & & & + + + + + + = −
Here, the housing stock depends on its past levels, Empowerment Zone status, 
neighborhood demographics, price and other considerations.  The kind of housing built in 
a neighborhood depends upon past levels because housing is a very durable asset, and 
changes in the housing stock (at the aggregate level) will be gradual.  These structural 
characteristics might also depend on EZ designation if program funds are used to clear 
abandoned housing or to subsidize construction of new housing.  The housing stock may 
also depend on the neighborhood demographics (if rich people demand different kinds of 
housing than poor people), municipal-level variables (zoning restrictions, tax treatment) 
and geographic variables (which are differenced out of equation (2)).  Finally, the price of 
housing may affect the kind of housing built because housing is produced using land and   9
capital.  Production theory suggests that if land becomes more expensive, some 
substitution towards more capital would be expected.  Since the value of a housing unit 
(our price variable) includes the value of the land on which it sits, some effect should be 
expected, although the sign depends on substitution elasticities in the production and 
consumption of housing services.   
  We apply similar logic to the modeling of neighborhood demographic 
characteristics. Neighborhood demographics follow a partial adjustment process, and we 
difference the equation to control for unobserved fixed effects.  
(3)  10 3 it N it EZ it S it P it M it it NN E Z S P M δ δδ δ δ δ ε − =+ ++ + + + & && & && & . 
In equation (3), N follows a partial adjustment process, where lagged changes in 
demographics are persistent because housing market frictions prevent neighborhood 
demographics from reaching their equilibrium levels between periods.  Demographic 
groups’ differing demands for neighborhood quality may cause them to sort into 
neighborhoods being improved by EZ programs according to their willingness to pay for 
these attributes (Diamond and Tolley, 1982).  Similar sorting according to municipal 
characteristics would be expected.  Similarly, changes in housing stock may attract 
different types of residents, at least when the capital stock is somewhat inelastic.  Finally, 
the price level in a neighborhood could affect neighborhood demographics if certain 
demographics are “priced out” of a neighborhood when prices increase. 
The system of first-differenced equations (1)-(3) can be represented in matrix 
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.   10
  In this paper, we are specifically interested in the total effect of the EZ policy 
intervention.  System of equations (4) shows us that these effects depend on its direct 
effect ( EZ β ), and also on its indirect effects.  Totally differentiating and dividing through 
by   yields:  Z E d &
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The total effect in neighborhood housing prices due to the implementation of the 
Empowerment Zone policy is thus available through the application of Cramer’s Rule: 
(6) 
() () S N P P S N P P N S
S N EZ EZ S N EZ N S EZ N EZ S EZ
Z E d
P d
δ γ δ γ δ β γ δ γ β
δ γ β γ δ β δ γ β δ β γ β β
− + − + −
− + + + +
=
1 &
& .  
The direct effect on price is captured by the first term in the numerator.  The next two 
terms are the first-order indirect effects:  Z E & ’s effect on P &  through   and  .  The third 
and fourth terms are the second-order indirect effects: 
S & N &
Z E & ’s effect on P &  through  ’s 
effect on   and  ’s effect on  .  The negative term corrects for double counting.  The 
denominator accounts for the bidirectional effects of 
S &
N & N & S &
P &  on   and   and their effects 
back on 
S & N &
P & .  If there is no simultaneity in equation (4) this total derivative reduces to the 
first three terms in the numerator.   
  As in Noonan et al. (2007), the system of equations is considerably more complex 
because S, N and M are vectors.  Hence, we assume that each variable in S depends on its 
own lag; the vectors EZ, N, M and G; and the contemporaneous values of the other 
variables in S.  Likewise, each N variable depends on its own lag; the vectors EZ, S, M 
and G; and the contemporaneous values of the other variables in N.  The system in   11
equation (4) thus models each   and   equation as dependent on that variable’s own 
lagged difference, 
S & N &
Z E & , M &  and the rest of the endogenous variables.   
  Intuitively, the suite of policies represented by the designation of an area as an 
urban EZ is meant to have several effects on a neighborhood.  On the one hand, if the 
money is spent on beautification, increased police patrols, or improved social services, 
there could be a direct improvement in the attractiveness of the neighborhood.  Such 
improvements would increase the demand for housing in the neighborhood, and increase 
the price of housing there.  On the other hand, a stated goal of the EZ program is to 
improve the employment situation for zone residents.  If the program is successful, 
unemployment or poverty in the area may decrease.  If high unemployment or poverty 
decreases property values,
9 then the EZ policy would have this indirect effect on housing 
values through neighborhood composition.  If program money is used to improve the 
housing stock (demolition of abandoned properties), and that improvement effects prices 
in the neighborhood (because the least valuable houses were demolished, or because the 
abandoned houses had been driving prices down), then there will be an indirect effect of 
the program on prices through improvements in the housing stock. 
  This paper tries to disentangle both the direct and indirect effects of EZ program 
participation.  To this end, the system of equations represented in (4) is estimated 
simultaneously.  To do so, we require at least one exogenous variable for each 
endogenous variable in each equation.  The partial adjustment theory used to generate the 
empirical equations suggests the twice-lagged levels of each variable will be both 
                                                 
9 This effect could be either direct (people having a direct preference to live near more affluent people) or 
indirect (decreased poverty leads to lower crime, which makes the neighborhood more attractive).   12
exogenous and excludable in the context above.  These excluded variables will be 
sufficient to identify the system and allow estimation.
10   
  A simpler method for obtaining indirect effects of the policy is available.  In 
estimating equation (1) with OLS, the coefficient βEZ represents the partial or direct effect 
of the Empowerment Zone policy intervention on prices, holding other endogenous 
variables constant.  However, if equation (2) were estimated constraining βS and βN to be 
zero (equivalently, omitting the endogenous variables from the regression), the returned 
coefficient on the policy variable EZ will represent the effect of the policy intervention 
holding nothing constant.  In other words, estimation of a price equation containing only 
the exogenous variables and EZ will return an unbiased estimate of the full effect 
computed in equation (6).  The difference between the direct and full effects is the 
indirect effect.  While this approach to the indirect effects makes it impossible to trace the 
avenues by which the indirect effects are generated (through S or through N), it is simple 
and probably more robust to misspecification than the systems approach.  For that reason, 
in this paper we will compute indirect and full effect by both methods. 
 
B.  Exogeneity of EZ 
Up to this point, we have assumed that the designation of a neighborhood for EZ 
status is exogenous.  This is a dubious assumption.  Greenbaum and Bondonio (2004) 
show that EZs are less populated; are poorer; have more minorities, unemployment and 
                                                 
10 Specifically, in the basic model, there is one price variable P, seven demographic variables in N, and four 
structure variables in S, leaving 12 equations in the system.  Each N and S equation includes a lag of the 
dependent variable in the partial adjustment model.  Thus each S and N equation has 12 endogenous 
variables, while the P equation has 11.  Twice-lagged levels of P, N and S are available as excluded 
instruments for each equation, leaving the S and N equations just-identified.  The EZ, M and G vectors 
serve as their own instruments.   13
renters; and have depressed housing values.  Wallace (2003) shows that – conditional on 
applying to become an EZ – an area was more likely to be designated an EZ if it was 
closer to the urban center, had higher poverty or was in a state with less experience with 
enterprise zones or more experience applying for federal funds.   
This non-random selection of EZs has been an important problem for researchers 
studying their effects.  In the context of state programs, Greenbaum and Engberg (2000) 
use propensity scores to select a comparable sample of zip codes for comparison of the 
effects of targeted incentives and compare the effects of actual zone selection versus zip 
code characteristics.  They find that on average, enterprise zones became worse, relative 
to non-zones, over the 1980’s, but that once you control for area characteristics, the 
effects of being in a zone were mostly insignificant. Elvery (2004) uses propensity score 
matching and, after considerable effort, is able to get the estimated effect of being in the 
Florida or California state enterprise zone programs back to insignificant. (More naïve 
estimates suggested negative effects.)  The possibility that program administrators are 
less likely to spend valuable resources on areas that are likely to have substantial 
rejuvenation in the absence of the program suggests that any estimate of the EZ 
program’s effects will produce downward biased effects if the special nature of the 
treatment group is ignored.  In this analysis, we address this problem in two ways. 
The first way that the problem is addressed is through the differencing outlined 
above.  If unobserved area characteristics are causing housing prices to be lower, 
residents to be poorer and less employable, and housing to be less well-maintained, the 
first-differencing of all the equations and the resultant focus on changes will get rid of 
these effects.     14
If EZ status is granted to areas where unobserved factors are causing a relative 
stagnation in a neighborhood, however, then even the first-difference coefficients will be 
biased down.  If there is something about the EZ neighborhoods that is causing them to 
become worse, degrading the housing stock and impoverishing the residents, then leaving 
this factor out will bias our results.  Obviously, in a study that is national in scope, it is 
impossible to directly control for all these factors.  Our second tactic is to seek out a 
comparison group that could reasonably be assumed to share trends in most of these 
unobserved factors, and compare the EZ group to this comparison group. 
To this end, we use the timing of the EZ program to identify such a group.  
Neighborhoods were granted EZ status in three waves: Round 1 in 1994, Round 2 in 
1998 and Round 3 in 2001.  It is reasonable to assume that the neighborhoods that 
entered the EZ program in these three waves are similar in the unobservable qualities that 
may negatively impact property values, neighborhood demographics and the upkeep of 
the neighborhood housing stock.  However, our data period ends in April 2000, when the 
2000 census was conducted.  It is unreasonable to expect that selection into the 2001 
round of EZ designation would have any causal effect on 1990-2000 trends in housing 
values, neighborhood demographics or housing stock.
11  Thus, we take the experiences of 
the Round 3 EZ neighborhoods as representing the counterfactual of what would have 
happened to the Round 1 EZ neighborhoods had the policy intervention not occurred, 
conditional on observables and time-invariant unobservables.  Our empirical equations all 
include controls for Round 2 EZ status and Round 3 EZ status so that the coefficient on 
                                                 
11 The legislation enabling the third round of Empowerment Zones did not pass the legislature until Dec. 
21
st, 2000.  Workshops for interested applicant jurisdictions occurred in June, 2001.  Selection occurred on 
the last day of 2001, with the designation becoming effective the next day.  Given this timeline, it is 
unlikely that even expectation effects could have increased prices in early 2000 in Round 3 EZs.   15
Round 1 (“EZ1”) status will reproduce an estimate of the direct effect of EZ selection on 
each of the neighborhood indicators we examine. 
The validity of this approach rests on the equivalence of the “unobserved effect” 
for the Round 1 and Round 3 EZ neighborhoods.
12  The approach is valid whether HUD 
administrators attempted to use the program to help especially distressed neighborhoods, 
or whether they attempted to pick neighborhoods that were likely to rebound on their own 
to make the program look successful.  If the decision rule (concerning the unobserved 
factors) changed between 1994 and 2001, the approach will fail to control for policy 
endogeneity.  Obviously, this cannot be directly tested.  Greenbaum and Bondonio (2004) 
compare the tracts selected in the three rounds and find that Round 3 and Round 1 census 
tracts are not significantly different in median income and in value of owner-occupied 
housing, although they differ in many other (observable) respects.
13  They also show that 
the relationship between the probability of selection into an EZ and various observable 
characteristics differed between rounds, and that in the later rounds selection appears to 
depend less on observable characteristics.
14  In our data, across the 17 neighborhood-level 
variables we examine, the difference in the changes experienced over the 1980’s for 
Round 1 and Round 3 neighborhoods are statistically different from one another for nine 
variables, it was substantively large in eight, and it was both statistically and 
                                                 
12 It bears emphasis that if unobserved factors in levels differ, they will be differenced out.  Only difference 
in the changes in unobserved factors will affect our results. 
13 It should be stressed that while the statistical significance of these difference is often extreme, the 
substantive differences are less extreme except in the case of population density.  Third round EZ 
neighborhoods still have relatively high unemployment, poverty and minority rates, and low education, 
rental and ownership rates.   
14 This last result could be arising because the selection process was becoming more focused on the 
unobservables, or because the selection process was becoming more random.   16
substantively significant in seven cases.
15  In our empirical section, the control variables 
will take care of the half of the variables that differ in observable ways between Round 1 
and Round 3 EZs.  We will have to hope that any remaining unobserved “distressed 
neighborhood” effect is time-invariant and washed away in the first-differencing or that 
the time-varying unobservable effect is the same for Round 1 and Round 3 EZs. 
   
C.  Data 
We use neighborhood aggregate data to estimate the system of equations 
described in part A.  We use block-group level census data for the census years 1980, 
1990 and 2000 from Geolytics
®, Inc., which processes the data into constant census 2000 
geographies.  The constant geographies allow us to take the neighborhood (block group) 
as the unit of observation, and observe developing neighborhood outcomes as time 
elapses.   
There are four types of variables in the empirical model sketched in part A: P, N, 
S and M.  P is measured with the log of the median housing value as reported in the 
census long form.  In our baseline models, the neighborhood composition variables, N, 
include the percent of families with at least one worker, the proportion of households 
with incomes at or below 150 percent of the poverty line, the log of median household 
income, the proportion of people reported as being white and non-Hispanic, the average 
commute time for workers and the population density.  These variables were chosen 
either because they have been shown in hedonic studies to affect housing values, or 
                                                 
15 Statistical significance is measured at the .1 confidence level.  Substantive significance here means that 
the difference in means was greater than 50% the pooled average of the means for each round.  The sign of 
the mean was always the same across rounds.     17
because they are variables of special interest in the local economic development 
literature.
16  In addition, five more neighborhood composition variables are included in 
the “extended” models.  These include the proportion employed in manufacturing 
industries, the proportion of households who rent their property, the proportion of the 
population that lived in the same home five years prior to the census, the proportion of 
households that have children, and the proportion of the population aged over 25 with a 
college degree.  All these variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000. 
The housing stock variables, S, include the vacancy rate of neighborhood housing 
units, the median year built, the proportion of neighborhood housing units that are 
detached, single family units, the average number of rooms and the average number of 
bedrooms.  These are most of the relevant variables included in the census long form.  In 
some equations, we also add the proportion of neighborhood housing units with complete 
plumbing.  All these variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000.   
The variables discussed thus far are all endogenous: they are part of the system of 
equations.  We also include several exogenous variables.  The municipal-level variables, 
M, include measures for the median income, housing value and rental rate for the census-
defined place that contains the neighborhood; the proportion of families that have 
children and families that are “traditional families” with children; and the number of 
                                                 
16 Population Density and the proportion white are examples of the former.  The family labor market 
variable is an example of the latter.  The inclusion of the poverty and income variables could be justified by 
either rationale.  The commute time variable is also justified by both rationale: standard urban economic 
theory posits that house values should be declining as commuting time increases (all else equal), while the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis implies that workers in distressed inner-city neighborhoods will need to 
commute longer to find employment.     18
households in the place.
17  These variables are meant to capture the municipality’s tax-
base (income, housing values, rents and household count) and service provisions (the 
family variables).  We also include a variable derived from the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) School District Demographic System (SDDS) and the 1992 
and 2002 Census of Governments measuring per pupil expenditure in the elementary or 
unified school district that contains the centroid of the block group as a measure of public 
service quality.  These variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000.
18  In all the 
results reported for the price equation, we also include a battery of location 
characteristics, including a county-level amenity score, MSA-specific fixed effects and 
distance to the nearest historic city center interacted with metropolitan dummy variables.  
As time-invariant geographic attributes, these variables enter the structural model 
interacted with time, thus relaxing the assumption of constant hedonic prices over time 
for these characteristics.  In general, the addition of these variables did not affect the 
model appreciably.   
Finally, our variable of interest, EZ, includes three dummy variables.  These 
variables indicate in which round of the program the block group was included, and are 
mutually exclusive.  The specification of these variables are two dummy variables (EZ1 
and EZ2) equaling one if the block group fell into the first or second round, and a third 
dummy variable (EZever) that equals one if the block group was ever in an EZ, including 
the post-2000 census Round 3.  EZ1 and EZ2 can be interpreted as changes in EZ status 
                                                 
17 The place is the census’s closest approximation of the municipal or jurisdictional geography.  For areas 
falling outside any place, the county-level values are used, since such areas will presumably get their 
services from a county government instead of a municipal government. 
18 These place-level variables are considered exogenous on the logic that any one block group will make up 
a small-enough proportion of the place that it has negligible effect on place-level averages.   19
over the course of the 1990’s, while the variable EZever is merely a control variable, as 
discussed above.  The interpretations of the coefficients on EZ1 and EZ2 is thus the effect 
these variables have on the dependent variables, controlling for the fact that they have the 
unobserved “distressed” characteristic, as represented by the EZever variable.    
The empirical model also includes the lagged differences of many of these 
variables (the changes in all the S and N variables from 1980 to 1990).  These variables 
will also be endogenous given our assumptions.  Therefore, consistent estimation requires 
that each of these lagged differences be included as a separate equation in our system of 
equations.  The twice-lagged levels of all the variables serve as instruments for these 
lagged differences and for the contemporaneous differences in our equations of interest 
(equation (4)).  While the coefficients on the twice-lagged levels will not be consistent in 
the unreported regressions, we only need the fitted values they produce to be orthogonal 
to the error terms in the equations represented in (4).  Our theory suggests that this will be 
the case.   
Table 1 presents the average changes for all the variables for which we report 
results.  This table presents averages for the full sample of block groups (N≈196,000), the 
sample of block groups within MSA’s (N≈107,000), and the sub-sample average changes 
for block groups in each round of EZs.  To control for the possibility of persistent area-
wide changes, we run all regressions on differences from metropolitan averages.  This is 
equivalent to including a set of metropolitan-area dummies in every regression in that all 
coefficients are identified off of variation within the metropolitan area, not across.  It is 
worth noting the strong appreciation of Round 1 Empowerment Zones and the weak   20
appreciation of Round 3 Empowerment Zones.  This is a pattern that is preserved in the 
regression results reported below. 
 
IV.  Results 
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  Tables 2a and 2b report the results from 
OLS regressions for the full sample of block groups and the sub-sample of metropolitan 
block groups, respectively.  Tables 3a and 3b report coefficients for the endogenous 
variables in the price equation and the EZ1 variable’s coefficient in the other equations 
for the two samples.  Finally, Table 4 reports direct, full and indirect effects of the policy 
intervention on block group housing prices, as computed from the various specifications 
and models.   
  Turning first to the results in Tables 2a and 2b, most of the coefficients are fairly 
robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.  The primary variable of interest 
(EZ1) is positive, significant and substantively large: whether the additional demographic 
variables are included or not, the results indicate that EZ designation leads to an eventual 
increase in median home value of about 25% in the full sample and 27% in the MSA 
sample.  These are extremely large effects.  This in itself is a novel finding, as 
Greenbaum and Engberg (2000) find no statistically significant effects on land values for 
several state enterprise zone programs.  These results may be the product of a bias from 
some unobserved effect making selection into the EZ program in the first round more 
likely.  However, two considerations lead us to believe that upward bias is not the cause 
of these large coefficients.  First, most previous research on state programs has found a 
downward bias that must be eliminated through more sophisticated techniques.    21
Furthermore, Greenbaum and Bondonio (2004) show that, in terms of observables, third 
round EZs were generally less distressed than first round EZs.  If first round EZs are 
more distressed in trends as well as levels, our identification strategy would lead us to 
underestimate the effect of the EZ program.  As we will see below, the significance of 
this coefficient is extremely robust.   
There are at least four reasons why these effects appear so much larger than those 
in Greenbaum and Engberg (2000) and other appraisals of state enterprise zone programs.  
First, and most obviously, the EZ program differed from most state programs in that it 
offered not only tax incentives but substantial grants.  The influx of federal dollars and 
the community improvements that can be achieved with that spending may have a larger 
effect on land values (or other variables) than tax incentives alone.  Second, the fact that 
the EZ program is federal, included federal tax incentives (usually along with state and 
local incentives), probably means that the tax incentives were stronger than in state 
enterprise zones.  Also, the federal EZ program may have gotten better publicity in local 
media, helping businesses become aware of the potential benefits.  Finally, there are 
measurement issues that suggest the difference between these results and previous results 
may be (slightly) over-stated.  Most previous studies have been forced to use zip codes 
for information on employment, or other neighborhood outcomes.  Zip code boundaries 
do not match well with state enterprise zone boundaries.  Even if a study uses census tract 
or block group data, state enterprise zones were not drawn according to census 
geographies.   Researchers are forced to assign zone status to partially designated zip 
codes (or census tracts) according to some decision rule.  However justifiable that 
decision rule is, it will mean that the independent variable “enterprise zone” is measured   22
with error, biasing the coefficient towards zero.  With the federal Empowerment Zone 
program, zone boundaries were drawn to match very closely to 1990 census geographies.  
Thus, the measure of program status we are able to obtain for the federal program is 
relatively error free.  This eliminates a downward bias that is present in most state 
enterprise zone studies. 
  The coefficient on EZever is also of interest.  The negative, significant coefficient 
on this variable implies that if the Round 1 EZ block groups had not gotten the EZ policy 
intervention they would have been witness to substantial declines in home values over the 
1990s.  This is picking up the “distressed neighborhood” effect that would bias down the 
coefficient on EZ1 if EZever was not also included.  These broad conclusions – that the 
direct effect of the empowerment zone program is significant and positive and that the 
“distressed neighborhood” proxy is significant and negative –  are robust to sets of 
control variables, sample composition and estimation method.    
  Tables 3a and 3b present results from the system of equations estimation.    These 
more complete results show the effect of EZ1 in all the other equations of interest.
19  
Turning first to the coefficients in the price equation, the direct price effect of the EZ1 
variable stays above 20% and gets even larger in the metropolitan sample as more 
variables and equations are added to the system.  The strong, significant negative effects 
of EZever remain and are particularly strong in the metropolitan sample.  
  The coefficients of the other endogenous variables in the price equation bear some 
discussion.  First, many of the coefficients are large in the extended models.  This is 
largely a result of the small range of values of these variables.  The coefficients represent 
                                                 
19 Recall that there are also another set of equations predicting the lagged differences of each of the 
endogenous variables, save price.  However, it is not instructive to look at these equations.     23
the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable, but a one unit change in most 
of these variables would represent a wild extrapolation from the limited range of these 
aggregate variables.  More troubling is the robustness of these coefficients across models.  
Comparing coefficients from the full sample and the metropolitan sample, many 
variables’ effects seem to change sign, significantly.  Of the 17 control variables, nine of 
them change from increasing price to decreasing prices or vice versa when we purge rural 
neighborhoods from the sample.  Only five seem to significantly affect prices in the same 
direction in both samples.  We do not have strong intuitive explanations for most of these 
sign switches, and even some of the consistent estimates are hard to square with intuition 
(e.g. more whites hurts property values, but more renters helps them).  Similar instability 
can be seen in observing the changes in coefficients as the plumbing variable is added.  
This addition had little effect in the OLS regressions in Tables 2a and 2b.  However, the 
magnitudes of several variables (avg. rooms and % Solo Units in the full sample; avg. 
rooms and bedrooms and percent college in the MSA sample) change considerably when 
it is added in the system.  While these changes are not as large as those between the full 
and MSA sample, they nonetheless highlight that the coefficients of the endogenous 
variables are not extremely robust. 
  The lower panels of Tables 3a and 3b report the coefficients of the EZ1 variable 
in all the endogenous equations of the system.  These results are somewhat more 
consistent across samples, although there is somewhat more variation within sample, 
across specifications.  First, it should be noted that the program effect is often significant, 
although not always in the direction program managers may have hoped.  Of the non-
price effects that we can be fairly sure of, it appears that the Empowerment Zone policy   24
intervention increased neighborhood poverty, vacancies and the average number of 
bedrooms, while it decreased population density (and thus population), the proportion 
renters, the proportion long-term residents, the proportion of stand-alone structures, the 
average number of rooms and the proportion of workers employed in industrial sectors.  
Focusing on the MSA sample (which we believe to be the relevant one), it also seems 
likely that EZ1 increased the proportion of families that worked, the proportion of the 
population that is white and the proportion of families with children under 18 years of 
age.  It also appears to have decreased commutes and the proportion of the population 
aged over 25 with a college degree.  One might be willing to hazard a guess about the 
program encouraging new construction (EZ1 has a consistently positive coefficient in the 
year built equations, but is never significant).   We would characterize these effects as 
mixed, based on our understanding of the goals of the policy. Whether these non-price 
effects are beneficial on net depends on how the effected characteristics are valued in the 
housing market. 
   With these results in hand, and the empirical model laid out in Section III.A, it is 
possible to calculate the full effects of Empowerment Zone status in two ways.  First, by 
comparing the coefficient on EZ1 in the last column of Tables 2a and 2b (which represent 
the “full effect”) to the direct effect as estimated in the first three columns of those tables 
(βEZ), we get six estimates of the indirect effect of the program on property values.  
Second, by plugging the coefficients from the price equation and the other equations into 
an expanded equation (6), we can calculate the full effect and compare it to the direct 
effect for each of the 6 estimates of system of equations (4).  The results of these 
exercises are reported in Table 4.  We find these results striking in light of the goals and   25
rationale of the policy.  Empowerment Zones were not billed as property value 
enhancement programs.  Instead, they were understood as attempts to affect 
neighborhoods for the better across a number of dimensions.  One would thus expect that 
the direct effects of Empowerment Zone interventions would be minimal, but that the 
indirect effects would be large.  To the extent that the results in Table 4 tell a story, it is 
the exact opposite one.  Across all models, the direct effects are very large.  On the other 
hand, the indirect effects are either quite small by comparison (estimated in OLS), or 
actually negative (estimated in the systems of equations).  While some of the estimates 
may strain credibility, the consistency of this story is striking.  There are no results 
pointing towards large positive indirect effects.  Disregarding the extreme results, we 
could peg the indirect effect of the Empowerment Zone program at somewhere between 
1% and -10%.   
  
V. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effects of a very generous economic development policy: 
the federal Empowerment Zone program.  This program offers the best chance to find 
positive effects of spatially targeted economic development policies because on top of the 
state and local tax incentives, federal tax incentives and direct federal investment is 
added.   
  This paper contributes to the literature because it is one of the first attempts to 
explicitly account for the complex, interacting processes which generate neighborhood 
measures like home values, demographic characteristics and housing stock 
characteristics.  While the equations we estimate are admittedly reduced form, the system   26
of equations approach allows for a much richer picture of neighborhood outcomes to 
emerge.   
  Although studies of state enterprise zones have struggled to find significant 
effects, we find a sizeable and significant positive effect on home values, and varying 
effects on other outcomes of interest.  The significance and size of these effects are 
probably explained by the generosity of the federal program, along with better 
measurement of program status because of the close matching of EZ boundaries with 
census geographies.  The indirect effects of EZ status on home prices through the other 
endogenous variables appear to be either extremely small or actually perverse.  These 
results fit well into the existing literature on spatially targeted economic development 
programs.  The recent literature on state programs (e.g. Bondonio and Greenbaum 2007), 
which rely completely on tax incentives, has shown them on net to be ineffective.  
Moreover, the developing literature on the effects of the federal program (Oakley and 
Tsao 2006, 2007a, b) finds generally unimpressive effects of the intervention on 
neighborhood indicators other than price.  The results in this paper suggest that the 
federal grants are able to affect local quality of life with complex and not generally 
positive net effects on other neighborhood attributes.   
  We believe that these results raise questions about what the federal Empowerment 
Zone program has accomplished and how.  The strong positive direct effect suggests the 
program is working, perhaps through improved amenities (lower crime, better 
infrastructure or better access to employment).  Another possibility is that the positive 
increase in price represents a composition effect.  Density decreases in these 
neighborhoods.  A possible interpretation is that federal money is being spent to knock   27
down low-value homes, increasing the median value in a neighborhood.  Such an 
intervention would provide little beneficial neighborhood revitalization, and so we see the 
non-price effects of the program are extremely mixed.  While this is possible, the sheer 
size of the EZ1 effect makes it unlikely that this is the only explanation.  
  Another aspect worth examining is program heterogeneity.  While this paper has 
concentrated on the average effect of the policy intervention, Oakley and Tsao (2006) 
show that there is some heterogeneity across Empowerment Zones in terms of the non-
price effects of the program.  This is to be expected since the actual policy intervention in 
each zone would differ according to the zone’s administration, goals and strategies.  
Whether differences in policy outcomes are correlated with differences in the policy 
implementation in a sensible way is an interesting question.  The identification strategy 
used here would not be appropriate for such an examination.  The possibility of positive 
or negative spatial spillovers from Empowerment Zones is also worth consideration.  
Oakley and Tsao (2007a) show some suggestive evidence that the Chicago 
Empowerment Zone had positive spillovers in terms of poverty reduction.  Chicago was 
also the Empowerment Zone with the strongest in-zone effects on poverty.  Whether such 
spillover effects also pertain to these strong price effects remains to be seen.  
Examination of such effects could aid in our understanding of how the price effect arises.  
An effect on prices which arises solely through a composition effect, for instance, should 
not have strong spillover effects.  
  Further work might also be done on the indirect effects of EZ status on the other 
variables.  Two variables of interest are the family labor market variable and the college 
education variable.  The first is a direct target of the program, while both have been   28
hypothesized to have positive externality effects in neighborhoods.  At least in urban 
areas, the Empowerment Zone program seemed to have conflicting effects on these 
variables (increasing working families but decreasing college attainment).  However, the 
price of housing did affect these variables.  To the extent that these coefficients represent 
causal relationships, the positive effect of home prices in the labor market equation 
combined with the positive effect of EZ status in the home price equation opens at least 
one avenue through which EZ status could indirectly affect labor-market out comes in an 
area.   
  Spatially-targeted economic development programs are an important feature in 
the landscape of social policy in America.  Because much of the cost of these programs is 
off the books, they are popular.  The suite of policies at local state and federal levels 
create considerable variation in the intensiveness of these interventions.  Considerable 
effort has been and will continue to be directed towards understanding the effects of these 
policies, and what works.  To that end, this paper can be seen as adding to the literature in 
examining the effects of a very generous program.  At the same time, these policy-
induced variations in taxes and expenditures represent an opportunity to examine the 
forces affecting neighborhood change along a host of measurable dimensions.  From that 
perspective, the differences in results across programs (state, federal) and across 
dimensions (price, non-price) offer insight into neighborhood dynamics and the workings 
of the various housing sub-markets in metropolitan areas.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 1990’s changes, main variables. 
  Variable  Sample 
   
  Change 1990-2000 of: 
Full  MSA Only Round 1  Round 2  Round 3 
ln(median  Home  Value)  0.3603 0.3899 0.5306 0.3403 0.2451  P 
  0.3236 0.3208 0.6013 0.4356 0.3761 
Family  Worker  0.0021 0.0046 0.0769 0.0361 0.0392 
  0.0937 0.0956 0.1831 0.1451 0.1439 
%  Poor  -0.0028 0.0006 -0.0302 -0.0123 -0.0163 
  0.1049 0.1058 0.1942 0.1384 0.1688 
ln(median  Income)  0.3339 0.3341 0.4037 0.3337 0.3702 
  0.2470 0.2493 0.4851 0.3223 0.3909 
%  White  -0.0680 -0.0818 -0.0286 -0.0585 -0.0699 
  0.1133 0.1202 0.1174 0.1210 0.1364 
Commute (minutes)  2.1018 1.7819 2.6457 2.2904 1.6862 
  5.1606 4.9910  10.9184  6.8534 6.5260 
Pop. Density  275.275  280.656  11.396  -610.596  -186.470 
N 
  3222.56 2373.90  10635.08  7410.43 2147.08 
%  Industrial  -0.0624 -0.0624 -0.0791 -0.0662 -0.0488 
  0.0901 0.0893 0.1600 0.1044 0.1155 
%  Renter  -0.0053 -0.0069 -0.0245 -0.0055 0.0102 
  0.1010 0.1086 0.1569 0.1062 0.1384 
% In Same House  0.0168  0.0240  0.0134  -0.0019  0.0071 
  0.1272 0.1334 0.1745 0.1363 0.1474 
% w/ Kids  -0.0020  -0.0013  0.0011  -0.0021  0.0001 
  0.0648 0.0666 0.1097 0.0808 0.0938 
%  College  0.0495 0.0514 0.0319 0.0340 0.0247 
Nx 
  0.0846 0.0891 0.0946 0.0953 0.0813 
%  Vacant  -0.0101 -0.0128 0.0029 -0.0055 -0.0174 
  0.0686 0.0699 0.1382 0.0971 0.1148 
median  Year  Built  3.7079 3.6992 3.4684 7.5591 3.4443 
  29.4367 30.4202 51.0575 82.2143 18.4519 
%  Solo  Unit  0.0030 0.0045 0.0216 0.0189 0.0154 
  0.0967 0.1074 0.1426 0.1139 0.1216 
avg. # Rooms  0.0980  0.0641  -0.0064  0.0408  0.0674 
  0.4815 0.5038 0.7387 0.5379 0.5870 
avg. # Bedrooms  0.0055  0.0097 -0.0312 0.0012 -0.0147 
  0.2597 0.2722 0.4482 0.3055 0.3391 
% Complete Plumbing  -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0160 -0.0076 -0.0060 
S 
  -0.0309 0.0350 0.0753 0.0432 0.0372 
Place: Households  17957.1  20186.8  49308.3 7763.3 29712.0 
  42112.0 35171.0 82244.1 19169.1 22133.8 
Place:  med.  Value  34780.8 40357.3 33526.1 25502.9 20528.9 
  34425.6 37917.3 26645.8 16029.5  8753.4 
Place: med. Rent  42.1022  47.7118 41.0000 30.3126 22.1155 
  80.4618 80.8110 56.9921 40.6058 40.7479 
Place: med. Income  10379.7  10720.2  7411.5  7488.9  7675.3 
  4849.06 5175.64 3101.73 2510.01 2500.91 
Place: % w/ Kids  -0.0097  -0.0069  0.0074  -0.0073  -0.0048 
  0.0289 0.0285 0.0183 0.0294 0.0162 
Place: % Trad. Fam.   -0.0241  -0.0203  -0.0019  -0.0203  -0.0235 
M 
  0.0284 0.0278 0.0162 0.0276 0.0140   33
District: expend./pupil  3.6552 3.9901 4.4081 4.2345 3.5027   
  2.0704 2.2658 1.0727 2.0203 1.4945 
EZ1  0.0075  0.0084  1 0 0 
  0.0862  0.0912     
EZ2  0.0065  0.0086  0 1 0 
  0.0804  0.0925     
EZ3  0.0035  0.0057  0 0 1 
EZ 
  0.0594  0.0755     
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Table 2a: OLS results Full Sample          
                
Model  Basic Extended  Extended’  Full  effect 
EZ1  0.2406 *** 0.2424 *** 0.2455  ***  0.2517 *** 
EZ2  0.0608 *** 0.0585 *** 0.0595  ***  0.0523 ** 
EZever  -0.0293 *  -0.0254   -0.0248    -0.0054   
WorkingFam  0.0210 *  0.0017   0.0028        
Poverty  -0.0872 *** -0.1025 *** -0.0997  ***      
Ln(Median Income)  0.1684 *** 0.1528 *** 0.1525  ***      
% White  0.1761 *** 0.1701 *** 0.1677  ***      
Avg Commute  -0.0004 **  -0.0006 *** -0.0006  ***      
Pop. Density  -4.2E-07   -5. 9E-07   -6.5E-07        
% Industrial Emp.      0.0333 *** 0.0339  ***      
% Renters      0.0098   0.0110        
% in same house      -0.1738 *** -0.1728  ***      
% w/ Children      -0.0451 *** -0.0452  ***      
% College      0.1647 *** 0.1648  ***      
% Vacant  -0.0086   -0.0187   -0.0120        
Median Year Built  0.0014 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0014  ***      
% Solo Units  -0.2131 *** -0.1674 *** -0.1632  ***      
Avg. Rooms  0.1072 *** 0.1061 *** 0.1069  ***      
Avg. Bedrooms  -0.0440 *** -0.0398 *** -0.0433  ***      
% w/ Plumbing          0.2446  ***      
Place: Households  -3.6E-07 *** -3.6E-07 *** -3.6E-07  ***  -4.4E-07 *** 
Place: Med. Value  2.7E-06 *** 2.6E-06 *** 2.6E-06  ***  2.8E-06 *** 
Place: Med. Rent  3.0E-05 *** 1.5E-05   1.5E-05    -2.8E-05 ** 
Place: Med. Income  -4. 8E-06 *** -4.6E-06 *** -4.6E-06  ***  -1.9E-06 *** 
Place: % Children  -1.1741 *** -1.1267 *** -1.1278  ***  -1.7093 *** 
Place: % Trad. Fam.  0.8248 *** 0.7118 *** 0.7200  ***  1.1824 *** 
District Exp./Pupil  -0.0178 *** -0.0180 *** -0.0179  ***  -0.0201 *** 
County: Amenity  -0.0104 *** -0.0100 *** -0.0101  ***  -0.0108 *** 
         
N  197310   195962   195962    197310  
R
2 0.232   0.239   0.239    0.160  
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Table 2b: OLS results MSA Sample         
                
Model  Basic Extended  Extended’  Full  Effect 
EZ1  0.2729 *** 0.2734 ***  0.2748 ***  0.2835 ***
EZ2  0.0665 *** 0.0631 **  0.0647 ***  0.0555 ***
EZever  -0.0362 ** -0.0288 *  -0.0278 *  -0.0083    
WorkingFam  0.0371 *** 0.0165   0.0175        
Poverty  -0.0263 ** -0.0434 ***  -0.0414 ***       
lnMed.Income  0.1659 *** 0.1420 ***  0.1421 ***       
% White  0.1766 *** 0.1553 ***  0.1531 ***       
Avg Commute  0.0000  -0.0002   -0.0002        
Pop. Density  2.5E-06 *** 2.2E-06 ***  2.1E-06 ***       
% Industrial Emp     -0.0224 *  -0.0223 *       
% Renters     0.0131   0.0143        
% in same house     -0.1549 ***  -0.1542 ***       
% w/ Children     -0.0140   -0.0143        
% College     0.2862 ***  0.2853 ***       
% Vacant  -0.0086  -0.0218   -0.0160        
Median Year Built  0.0015 *** 0.0015 ***  0.0015 ***       
% Solo Units  -0.1933 *** -0.1348 ***  -0.1317 ***       
Avg. Rooms  0.1075 *** 0.1012 ***  0.1016 ***       
Avg. Bedrooms  -0.0297 *** -0.0261 ***  -0.0283 ***       
% w/ Plumbing         0.2844 ***       
Place: Households  -3.6E-08  -5.7E-08 **  -5.8E-08 **  8.1E-08 ***
Place: Med. Value  1.3E-06 *** 1.2E-06 ***  1.2E-06 ***  1.3E-06 ***
Place: Med. Rent  -2.9E-05 ** -4.9E-05 ***  -4.9E-05 ***  -6.5E-05 ***
Place: Med. Income  -1.9E-06 *** -1.7E-06 ***  -1.7E-06 ***  1.0E-06 ***
Place: % Children  -1.0345 *** -0.9544 ***  -0.9650 ***  -1.4999 ***
Place: % Trad. Fam.  1.1414 *** 0.9874 ***  1.0033 ***  1.5535 ***
District Exp./Pupil  -0.0025 *** -0.0028 ***  -0.0028 ***  -0.0028 ***
County: Amenity  -0.0013  -0.0028 ***  -0.0028 ***  -0.0002    
        
N  107730  107031   107031   107730  
R
2 0.147  0.160   0.161   0.049  
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Table 3a: 3SLS full sample      
            
Price  Simple Extended  Extended’ 
EZ1  0.2160 ***  0.3422 ***  0.2711 *** 
EZ2  0.0788 ***  -0.2445 ***  -0.3747 *** 
EZever  -0.0158   -0.1621 ***  -0.2023 *** 
WorkingFam  -3.5726 ***  11.3906 ***  13.0496 *** 
Poverty  2.1295 ***  -16.5620 ***  -20.9433 *** 
lnMed.Income  2.2403 ***  -8.0209 ***  -10.0910 *** 
% White  -1.5308 ***  -7.2008 ***  -9.1066 *** 
Avg Commute  0.1649 ***  -0.3816 ***  -0.5027 *** 
Pop. Density  -0.0001 ***  -0.0005 ***  -0.0007 *** 
% Vacant  -2.4090 ***  -28.1120 ***  -32.9693 *** 
% Industrial Emp     -6.6994 ***  -9.3463  *** 
% Renters     10.0990 ***  11.9005  *** 
% in same house     -8.4519 ***  -12.0999  *** 
% w/ Children     -11.0225 ***  -15.8295  *** 
% College     6.3956 ***  8.5921  *** 
Median Year Built  -0.0017 ***  0.0357 ***  0.0480 *** 
% Solo Units  -1.3031 ***  0.7718 ***  1.7678 *** 
Avg. Rooms  -0.1235 ***  0.0951 *  0.1647 ** 
Avg. Bedrooms  -0.3929 ***  -5.0659 ***  -5.2273 *** 
% w/ Plumbing              -8.4891  *** 
Off-Price                   
WorkingFam  -0.0312 ***  0.0022   -0.0001    
Poverty  0.0316 ***  0.0220 ***  0.0115 ** 
lnMed.Income  0.0278 ***  0.0209 *  0.0165    
% White  -0.0353 ***  0.0001   -0.0078    
Avg Commute  1.9079 ***  -0.6849 **  -0.3125    
Pop. Density  -68.9543   -55.9165   -16.4487    
% Vacant  -0.0066   0.0160 ***  0.0170 *** 
% Industrial Emp     -0.0231 ***  -0.0313 *** 
% Renters     -0.0518 ***  -0.0480 *** 
% in same house     -0.0417 ***  -0.0460  *** 
% w/ Children     0.0017   -0.0016     
% College     -0.0024   0.0135 ** 
Median Year Built  1.2598   -3.7970 ***  -3.2551 *** 
% Solo Units  -0.0096   -0.0019   -0.0050    
Avg. Rooms  -0.1804 ***  -0.0294   -0.0091    
Avg. Bedrooms  0.0725 ***  0.0656 ***  0.0707 *** 
% w/ Plumbing              -0.0080  *** 
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Table 3b: 3SLS MSA sample      
            
Price  Simple Extended  Extended’ 
EZ1  0.2485 ***  0.4651 ***  0.4779 *** 
EZ2  -0.0500   0.3063 ***  0.3787 *** 
EZever  -0.1188 ***  -0.2511 ***  -0.2367 *** 
WorkingFam  -8.7933 ***  -6.4868 ***  -7.0209 *** 
Poverty  7.1189 ***  0.9146 ***  2.3729 *** 
lnMed.Income  5.6769 ***  3.9366 ***  4.7370 *** 
%White  -1.4135 ***  -0.7718 ***  -0.3220 *** 
Avg Commute  0.1327 ***  0.0704 ***  0.1155 *** 
Pop. Density  -0.0004 ***  -0.0001 ***  -0.0002 *** 
%Vacant  6.3792 ***  5.0647 ***  5.8866 *** 
% Industrial Emp     -0.5103 ***  0.1122   
% Renters     3.8106 ***  3.7122  *** 
% in same house     3.9499 ***  5.6772  *** 
% w/ Children     7.6550 ***  10.9100  *** 
% College     -0.3087 *  -1.4349  *** 
Median Year Built  -0.0117 ***  -0.0146 ***  -0.0150 *** 
% Solo Units  7.9449 ***  6.7368 ***  8.2648 *** 
Avg. Rooms  -0.0302   0.2843 ***  0.0647 *** 
Avg. Bedrooms  2.7865 ***  -0.4026 **  -0.1929  
% w/ Plumbing         15.5491   
Off-Price           
WorkingFam  0.0131 *  0.0429 ***  0.0348 *** 
Poverty  0.0146 ***  0.0276 ***  0.0268 *** 
lnMed.Income  0.0105   -0.0033   0.0051  
% White  -0.0163   0.0409 ***  0.0398 *** 
Avg Commute  0.2556   -0.6868 **  -0.5621 * 
Pop. Density  -454.5628 ***  -626.6654 ***  -636.8403 *** 
%Vacant  0.0211 ***  0.0196 ***  0.0216 *** 
% Industrial Emp     -0.0083   -0.0103  
% Renters     -0.0603 ***  -0.0627 *** 
% in same house     -0.0249 ***  -0.0173  * 
% w/ Children     0.0143 ***  0.0180  *** 
% College     -0.0392 ***  -0.0369 *** 
Median Year Built  1.2283   1.0933   0.5060  
% Solo Units  0.0065   -0.0259 ***  -0.0206 *** 
Avg. Rooms  -0.0338   -0.0842 ***  -0.0862 *** 
Avg. Bedrooms  0.0473 ***  0.0782 ***  0.0777 *** 
% w/ Plumbing         -0.0008   
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Table 4: Partial, Full and Indirect Effects, various models 
Sample Estimation Model  Partial  Full  Indirect 
Simple 0.241  0.252  0.011 
Extended 0.242 0.252 0.009  OLS 
Extended’ 0.246  0.252  0.006 
Simple 0.216  0.173  -0.043 
Extended 0.342 -0.136  -0.478 
Full 
3SLS 
Extended’ 0.271 -0.145 -0.417 
Simple 0.273  0.283  0.011 
Extended 0.273 0.283 0.010  OLS 
Extended’ 0.275  0.283  0.009 
Simple 0.248  0.236  -0.013 
Extended 0.465 0.387 -0.078 
MSA 
3SLS 
Extended’ 0.478  0.385 -0.093 
 